This subject addresses central aspects of Industrial Economics and Economic Policy. Its first part focuses on the theoretical, i.e., mathematical and conceptual, models that are used to classify markets in terms of their structural features. Price setting strategies will be illustrated in the second part, which will be followed by relevant topics in competition policy, with reference to EU antitrust cases.
The subject aims to provide fundamental concepts of Economics, Monopoly & Oligopoly Models, Basic Consumer Theory as well as Game Theory applied to these fields. Price setting strategies will be illustrated to highlight the importance of economic analysis to understand realistic business situations.
On completion of the subject, the students will have acquired a thorough understanding of the dynamics of the competitive process involving strategic players, as well as the rationales that underpin the intervention of Antitrust Agencies. In particular, students will:
Prior knowledge of Microeconomics and Mathematical Optimization is useful, but not compulsory.
Teaching is organized in class or online lectures. Students will be encouraged to discuss the business tactics that the Instructor will propose
Part 1: Market Structures
Perfect Competition; Monopoly; Elements of Game Theory; Oligopoly: static and dynamic models, with and without differentiated products; Monopolistic competition with Address models.
Identifying and Assessing Market Power: methods for Market definition; The Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm and its latest developments (Sutton’s Exogenous and Endogenous Sunk Costs).
Part 2 – Business Practices
Pricing strategies: First, Second, Third Degree Price Discrimination; using Two-Part Tariffs to price discriminate; Using Bundling and Tie-in sales to price discriminate; Intertemporal Price Discrimination. Price dispersion: the role of search and switching costs. Market with Network goods.
Part 3 – Strategic Behaviour and Competition Policy
Price Fixing (horizontal agreements): Cartels and the Sustainability of Tacit Collusion; identifying Collusion; Factors that facilitate Collusion.
Horizontal Mergers: Unilateral Effects (excessive increase in market power); Coordinated effects; Merger Remedies (Divestitures, behavioural); Merger Policy in the EU. Case Studies.
Vertical Integration and Mergers: Exclusionary effects; Vertical Price Restraints; Non-Price Vertical Restraints.
Belleflamme, P. and Peitz, M. (2015). Industrial Organization. Markets and Strategies. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
Carlton, D. and Perloff, J. 2005. Modern Industrial Organization, Pearson
Davis, P. and Garces, E. (2010). Quantitative Techniques for Competition and Antitrust Analysis. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ USA.
Motta, M. (2004). Competition Policy. Theory and Practice. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
Pepall, Richards, Norma, Industrial Organization: Contemporary Theory and Empirical Applications. fifth edition, Blackwell Publishing, 2013.
Pepall, Richards, Norman, Calzolari, Organizzazione Industriale, McGraw Hill, III edizione, 2017.
Ricevimento: Claudio A. Piga (claudio.piga@unige.it) Office Hours: TUESDAY 10.30 -12.30 (Teams or, prior appointment, in Office at DIEC)
CLAUDIO ANTONIO GIUSEPPE PIGA (President)
GABRIELE CARDULLO
MAURIZIO CONTI (President Substitute)
February at the sstart of the second semester of the academic year
Written, calendar specified on EasyAcademy
The exam consists of open-ended questions as well as numeric exercises.
